We develop a model of infinitely repeated elections with complete information, and analyze an equilibrium in which campaign rhetoric plays a role, when the value of the candidates' reputation is large enough. We show how the existence of future elections may enable candidates to alter voters' beliefs with cheap talk statements, in a model in which candidates are purely ideological. We obtain that voters are better off in an equilibrium in which candidates' promises are credible. We show that when the candidates' utility functions are linear, candidates' payoffs in equilibrium are unaffected by the size of the set of credible promises.
Introduction
Campaign statements are cheap talk, that is, fixing all actions of all participants, no payoffs differ when messages alone are changed. Consider then a problem in which there is a single election in which candidates vie for office. Suppose candidates are ideological, that is, that they have no utility for holding office, but care only about the policy chosen. In this environment, any candidate who is elected will choose that alternative that he most prefers, regardless of any campaign promise that might have been made. Then no campaign promise can alter voters' beliefs about what action will be taken by a candidate who is elected. If there were any statement that did alter beliefs in a way that increased the probability of election for a candidate, the candidate would make such a statement regardless of what he intended to do if elected. Hence, no campaign statement can convey information that alters the chance of election.
1
When we move from the case of a single election to multiple elections, campaign promises may be costly. Voters may vote differently in future elections if a candidate promises to do something if elected, but reneges on that promise after election. Simply put, voters may punish a candidate for reneging on campaign promises by voting him out of office. Threats of such punishment can support an equilibrium in which campaign promises are kept, and in which voters' beliefs about what a candidate will do if elected are affected by campaign promises. There is a potential problem, however, with equilibria in which promises are believed because of threatened reprisals by voters: the threat to vote a candidate out of office may not be credible. In the election following a candidate's reneging on a campaign promise, it may be that the candidate is nevertheless more desirable than the alternative. At this point, voters would prefer the candidate despite his past behavior to his opponent. In game theoretic terms, the threat to vote a candidate out of office regardless of his opponent is a dominated strategy. In principle, we would like to restrict equilibrium to undominated strategies, a consequence of which is that voters must vote for candidates whose future choices are most preferred, regardless of past behavior.
If voters are restricted to voting for candidates solely on their prediction of future behavior, the only way that reneging on a campaign promise can alter future voting is if that reneging altered voters' prediction of the candidate's future behavior. For rhetoric to matter we need the candidate's payoff if he reneges to differ from the payoff he obtains if he fulfills his promise, that is, we need a different election outcome after a candidate has reneged than after a candidate has fulfilled his campaign promise.
In the next section we outline necessary ingredients of a rational actor model in which campaign rhetoric can matter. We discuss briefly how rhetoric can matter in finite election models with and without asymmetric information between the candidate and the voters before focussing on the case in which there are (potentially) an infinite number of elections and no asymmetric information. In this case we show how candidates may (rationally) choose to maintain a reputation for fulfilling campaign promises. We further discuss the determinants of the set of promises that candidates can credibly make in equilibrium.
How rhetoric can a ect voters' beliefs
Finite elections with complete information and indifferent voters: Notice that if we assume a two candidate competition game with a finite number of elections and complete information and voters are not indifferent, there is a unique election outcome equilibrium (in undominated strategies). Thus, rhetoric cannot matter. In this set up when enough voters are indifferent (enough to change the election outcome) rhetoric may play the role of the determining which equilibrium is being played. We illustrate this case with the following example. Consider the simple two election case in which there are three alternatives: A, B, and C, and suppose that both candidates are ideological with preferences in both elections as follows:
Suppose that voters' preferences for both elections are: U v (B) = 1, and 0 < U v (A) = U 1 (C) < 1. That is voters prefer alternative B, and they are indifferent between alternatives A and C. The following strategies form an equilibrium:
Candidate 1 : At the first election he promises B, and he does B. At the second election he promises A, and does A.
Candidate 2 : He promises C, and he does C, at both elections.
Voters: At the first election they vote for candidate 1. At the second election they vote for candidate 1 if he has kept his promise, otherwise they vote for candidate 2.
It is straightforward to verify that this is an equilibrium. There are, of course, other equilibria in which voters ignore all promises, and candidates always choose their most preferred outcome regardless of any promises made. Voters can vote for either of the two candidates in this case since the voters are indifferent over the outcomes they will choose.
The first equilibrium in which promises are made -and kept -by candidate 1 is supported by voters' threat to "throw him out of office" if he reneges on his promise to do B. This threat is credible because voters are indifferent over the two candidates. It isn't necessary that all voters be indifferent over the candidates in the second election, only that sufficiently many voters are indifferent to alter the outcome of the second election. In general, we do not find this example a compelling explanation of how campaign promises can have effect since it rests on the existence of a nontrivial set of indifferent voters.
A learning model: If voters are uncertain about a candidate's preferences over policies there is a possibility that reneging on a campaign promise alters voters' beliefs about what a candidate would do if reelected because in equilibrium some types of candidates will renege on a particular promise while other types would not. If there is partial separation of candidate types in equilibrium, it is possible that voters can vote out of office a candidate who reneges on a promise even when restricted to undominated strategies. In Aragones and Postlewaite (in progress), we lay out a two election model with voters who do not know exactly the policy preferences of a candidate. Prior to the first election candidates can make promises of the policy they will choose if elected. Voters form beliefs about the policy the candidate will choose if elected, which are rational in equilibrium, and vote for the candidate offering the higher expected utility of his predicted policy. If elected, the candidate chooses a policy. Following this, voters update their beliefs about the candidate's preference over second period alternatives given their prior beliefs, the equilibrium strategies, and the candidate's policy choice. With updated beliefs, in the second election, voters vote for the candidate who offers the highest expected utility. Candidates choose campaign promises and policy choices (if elected) to maximize the sum of expected utilities of policy outcomes for the two periods.
Thus in a model of finite repeated elections with asymmetric information, voters acquire information regarding the candidates' policy preferences from the fact that candidates renege or fulfill their campaign promises.
An infinite election reputation model: We showed above that with complete information, there can be equilibria in which rhetoric matters if there are sufficiently many voters who are indifferent. In the absence of indifferent voters (or when there are too few to alter the outcomes of elections), there will be a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which voters choose undominated strategies. When at each period there is a sufficiently high probability that a candidate may wish to run for reelection in the future, this is no longer the case: the prospect of future elections may allow both equilibria in which promises are ignored and equilibria in which promises (rationally) affect voters' beliefs about what a candidate will do if elected. We will illustrate this with a simple example.
As in the example above, we will consider two candidates who engage in a sequence of elections. Both the candidates' and the voters' preferences over alternatives are constant across elections. Candidates and voters alike maximize the discounted sum of utilities with discount factor δ < 1. There are three alternatives: A, B, and C. The candidates' preferences are as follows:
Voters' preferences are: U v (B) = 1, U 1 (C) = .5, and U v (A) = 0. If we consider an infinite sequence of elections, the following strategies form an equilibrium for δ > .1:
Candidate 1 : At each election he promises B, and if in the past he has always kept his promises he does B if elected. Otherwise, he does A if elected.
Candidate 2 : At each election he promises C, and he does C if elected. Voters: At each election they vote for candidate 1 if he promises to do B and in the past he has always kept his promises. Otherwise they vote for candidate 2.
It is straightforward to see that this is an equilibrium. In this equilibrium rhetoric matters, because voters' future behavior depends on candidate 1's fulfilling or reneging on his promises. As it is always the case, there is also an equilibrium in which rhetoric does not matter, as illustrated by the following strategies:
Candidate 1 : At each election he makes a random promise, and he does A if elected.
Candidate 2 : At each election he makes a random promise, and he does C if elected.
Voters: At each election voters ignore all promises and vote for candidate 2. This is a "babbling" equilibrium: candidates make random promises and always do their first best, and voters ignore all promises.
Consider a finite number of these elections and the restrictions of the strategies that comprise a subgame perfect equilibrium for the infinite game. Those restricted strategies will not be equilibrium strategies for the finite election game, no matter how large the number of elections. This is the standard "unraveling" argument: in the last period it is known that whichever candidate is elected will choose his most preferred outcome since there is no longer the threat of future punishment. But if his behavior in the last period is independent of past history, voters (who are not indifferent) will vote for whichever candidate has the more preferred (to the voter) first choice. But then, since reneging in the next to last period can have no effect on future election outcomes, candidates will choose their most preferred outcome regardless of promises, and so on.
In a model with complete information and infinite elections, promises can be credible in equilibrium as long as reputation has a value. A central point of this paper is that there is no technology that allows candidates to commit in the sense that commitment is taken to mean that the candidate is not able to deviate from his promises. Promises can always be broken, and will be broken if it is in the interest of the candidate to do so. Promises are kept only because it is in the interest of the candidate to do so, since the future payoffs are different for the candidate when he keeps his promise than when he does not. Promises may change voters' beliefs about the choices that candidates will make if elected because voters understand that it is sometimes in a candidate's selfish interest to fulfill his promises, even when there is a short-run gain from reneging. Voters also understand that the threat of future punishment is not sufficient to deter all reneging: some promises may be so far from a candidate's preferred outcome that the short-run gain from reneging is sufficiently high that a candidate will relinquish his electoral future. In short, the ability of a candidate to alter voters' beliefs is not a "technological" given, but rather, is an equilibrium phenomenon.
The assumption of infinite repeated elections can be motivated by con-sidering that at each election every candidate has a positive probability that he will run for reelection, that is no election is expected to be the last one. Formally, we model candidates with stochastic lives with infinite support. We assume complete information: voters know candidates' preferences over policies perfectly at the time they vote.
2 We assume that at each election candidates' reputation may be either good or bad: candidates with a good reputation are candidates who have never reneged in the past and candidates with a bad reputation are those who have reneged of a promise sometime in the past. Voters believe only promises of candidates who have a good reputation and never believe any promise of candidates who have a bad reputation. After each election, a winning candidate with a good reputation compares the one time benefit of reneging on any promise he may have made with the value of maintaining his reputation by fulfilling such promise. Candidates with a bad reputation choose their optimal policy independent of their promises. Voters predict that candidates with a bad reputation will implement their ideal policy regardless of any promises, and that candidates with a good reputation will fulfill any promise that is not too costly to carry out, that is, for which the benefit of reneging is less than the decrease in their continuation payoffs if they renege. These strategies comprise a subgame perfect equilibrium. If there is no uncertainty, candidates do not make promises they do not intend to keep since with complete information, voters can predict they will renege and the promise will not influence their voting. If there is uncertainty (symmetric between voters and candidates) about what alternatives will arise between the time of voting and the time at which the alternatives to the promise action are known, in equilibrium some promises will not be kept. It will happen precisely when the benefits of reneging outweigh the value of reputation.
In either case, candidates will be able to change voters' beliefs about the policy they will undertake as long as the discount factor is large enough. That is, as long as the future has sufficient value, candidates will carry out their promise when it is not too costly to do so. If there is a positive (expected) value to being elected in each of the future periods, the value to retaining a good reputation goes to infinity as the discount factor goes to one. For high enough value to retaining a good reputation, all promises will be kept (hence, believed by voters).
In these models, both the learning model and the reputation model, there will always be one equilibrium in which campaign rhetoric is irrelevant: all candidates make random promises, and for all messages they hear, voters do not alter their beliefs about a candidate's type or the choices he will make if elected. Candidates choose their most preferred policy if elected. Here, the only information relevant to voters is the candidate's choice: their predictions of choice in the second period are independent of any campaign promises, and hence reneging on campaign promises cannot affect voting in the second election.
More interesting is that in addition to this uninformative equilibrium, there may be equilibria in which voters do change their beliefs about candidates and their voting behavior on the basis of campaign promises.
Rhetoric matters if and only if candidates' payoffs if they renege on their campaign promises are different from the payoffs they obtain if they fulfill their promises. That is, we obtain different election outcomes following a failure to fulfill a promise than after a promise has been fulfilled. For the outcome of future elections to differ following fulfillment or nonfulfillment of promises, voters' strategies must depend on the relationship between a campaign promise and the policy choice of a candidate: voters' actions must depend on rhetoric.
In general, candidates will not be able to induce all possible beliefs in voters. Voters' have initial beliefs about a candidate's preferences over current and future policy alternatives. If voters believe that future policy choices are relatively unimportant to the candidate compared to immediate policy choices, they will (rationally) infer that the candidate will say anything to be elected since the cost (forfeiting future possibilities) is small compared to the gain. Hence, promises from such candidates will not alter beliefs. In summary, a candidate will have available to him a subset of the set of possible beliefs voters might have about the policy choices the candidate will choose if elected. It is important to note that the sets of beliefs that candidates can induce in voters are typically quite different, since they depend on voters' initial beliefs about the candidates. This construction provides a rational explanation for the exogenous cost of commitment assumed in Banks (1990) .
The model
We consider an infinitely repeated game of electoral competition. There are two candidates, L and R, that compete in all elections. At each election, the structure of the game is as follows:
Campaign stage: both candidates simultaneously make an announcement. Each candidate has to decide between making a promise about the policy he will implement in case he wins the election or sending a message empty of promises.
Voting stage: voters decide to give their vote to the candidate who maximizes their expected utility, which depends on the policy that will be implemented after the election.
Office stage: the winner of the election implements a policy.
Candidates and voters derive utility only from the policy implemented. We assume that the utility an agent obtains from each election is represented by
where x i represents the ideal point of agent i. The policy space is represented by the interval [−1, 1] . We assume that the ideal point of the median voter is the same at all elections, and normalized to be x m = 0.
Elections take place over time and the objective of all agents is to maximize their future expected payoffs. Agents discount future payoffs with a discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). The discount factor represents the weight that future payoffs have on candidates' total utility. Since the value of δ is less than one, elections that are further away in the future have less effect on the total utility of the candidate than elections that are more immediate. Alternatively δ can be interpreted as the probability that the candidate will run for reelection. More generally we can think of it as δ = λβ, where λ represents the probability that the candidate will run for reelection and β represents the discount factor.
We assume that the policy preferences of the two candidates change at each election. In particular, we assume that at each election the ideal point of candidate L is x L ∈ [−1, 0] , given by an independent random draw from a uniform probability distribution over [−1, 0] . Similarly at each election the ideal point of candidate R is x R ∈ [0, 1] , given by an independent (across candidates,and across periods) random draw from a uniform probability distribution over [0, 1] . Candidates' ideal points are drawn independently of each other and of past draws before each election.
Candidates know the preferences of the median voter, and at the beginning of each electoral period, voters and candidates learn the ideal points of both candidates for that period.
A candidate's strategy for the one period game consists of a pair (p, x) where x ∈ [−1, 1] represents the policy the candidate implements in case he wins the election, and p ∈ [−1, 1] × {∅} represents the announcement that the candidate makes at the campaign stage (either a promised policy or nothing). Formally, we may define a promise by the exact policy that will be implemented, in which case, if a candidate promises policy x ∈ [0, 1] , he will break his promise only if he implements x = x. We may also think of a promise as the worst policy that will be implement according to the median voter's preferences, that is if a candidate promises policy x ∈ [0, 1] , he will only break his promise if he implements x ∈ (x, 1] . In our model both definitions are equivalent.
Before deciding their vote, voters may update their beliefs about the candidates' policy choices in case they win the election, given the announcements made at the campaign stage. Given their beliefs, voters decide to vote for the candidate that maximizes their expected utility.
Since voters' know the candidates' ideal points, we assume that voters' priors over policy choice coincide with the candidates' ideal points. After the campaign stage voters may update their beliefs about the policy choices the candidates would make if elected. Voters decide rationally whether to believe the campaign promises or not. Voters will only believe a promise if honoring it is compatible with the candidate's incentives after the election. Thus, even though campaign promises do not affect the payoffs of any of the agents, they may affect their decisions.
Equilibrium with rhetoric
We analyze an equilibrium of this repeated game in which campaign promises matter, in the sense that different promises imply different strategy choices, and therefore lead to different payoffs.
Voters' strategies depend on the promises made by candidates during the campaign in the following way. If a candidate promises to implement a policy different from his ideal point, voters will only believe him if honoring his promise is compatible with the candidates' incentives after the election. Otherwise, voters believe that, in case he wins the election, the candidate will implement his ideal point. Similarly if a candidate decides to make no promises at the campaign stage we assume that voters believe that he will implement his ideal point.
The incentive compatible promises are characterized by a maximal distance d between the candidate's promise and his ideal point: voters may believe a promise only if it is not too far away from the candidate's ideal point. We will describe an equilibrium in which voters either believe any promise that is incentive compatible or none. There are other equilibria that can be thought of as intermediate cases in which voters believe some but not all promises that are incentive compatible. The equilibria in these cases will look exactly like the one we describe, with a smaller d.
Voters will punish candidates that break promises. Thus candidates that at the campaign stage decide to make no promises will not be punished, independently of what policy they implement in case they win the election.
Voters will consider that a promise has been broken when the policy implemented is worse for them than the policy promised during the campaign. Formally, if we define a promise by the exact policy that will be implemented, a candidate that promises policy x ∈ [0, 1] will be punished only if he implements x ∈ (x, 1] . If we define a promise as the worst policy that will be implement according to the voters' preferences, then a candidate that promises policy x ∈ [0, 1] , will only be punished if he implements x ∈ (x, 1] .
Voters punish a candidate that breaks a promise by not believing any promise he may make in the future, that is, after a candidate reneges from a promise, at all elections voters will believe that this candidate will implement his ideal point, and vote accordingly.
In the equilibrium we analyze, the voters' strategies at each voting stage are as follows: voters believe the incentive compatible promises made by all candidates who have always in the past fulfilled their promises; voters believe that all other candidates will implement their ideal point; and they vote according to these beliefs for the candidate that maximizes their expected utility.
This strategies essentially treat candidates as one of two types. At each election we may have candidates with a good reputation, who have never reneged of any promises and whose (incentive compatible) promises will be believed by voters; and candidates with a bad reputation, who have reneged on a promise at some time in the past, and independently of what promises they make at the campaign stage, voters will believe that if they win the election they will implement their ideal point.
After the election the winner implements the policy that maximizes his expected payoffs, taking into account that the voters' strategies for future elections might depend on the candidate's past promises and choices. Thus at this stage, candidates will compare the gains and costs of reneging. The gains from reneging are represented by the instantaneous increase in their utility produced by deviating from their promised policy, choosing instead their ideal point. The costs of reneging are reflected in their expected payoffs from future elections: the difference between the expected payoffs for a candidate with a good reputation and a candidate with a bad reputation. A candidate will only renege on a promise if the instantaneous gain is larger than his future expected loss.
In order to find equilibrium strategies for the two candidates we will consider three different cases: when both candidates have a bad reputation, when only one of the candidates has a good reputation, and when both have a good reputation.
Suppose that both candidates have a bad reputation. In this case, given than voters do not believe any promises (other than the candidates' ideal points) the cost of reneging is zero since no promises will be believed in any case, therefore at the 'office stage' all candidates will always implement their ideal points. Similarly, given that the only promise that is incentive compatible for the candidates is their own ideal point, it is optimal for the voters not to believe any other promise. Thus, we have that at each election the winner will be the candidate whose ideal point is closer to the ideal point of the median voter (zero) and the policy implemented after the election will be his ideal point. In this case, the expected payoff (prior to the realization of the candidates' ideal points) for each candidate at each election is given by (see figure 1 ):
Now suppose that candidate R has a bad reputation, which means that voters will believe that he will implement his ideal point, and candidate L has a good reputation, that is, voters believe all promises he makes that are consistent with incentive compatibility.
We start by assuming that voters believe all promises made by candidate L that are less than a distance d from his ideal point. Then, solving for the equilibrium strategies, we will find the maximal d that characterizes all incentive compatible promises.
If −x L < x R , candidate L wins by promising his ideal point. In this case, he does not need to make any promises, and obtains the maximal possible utility.
If −x L > x R , candidate L loses if he does not make any promise or if he cannot credibly promise a policy that is closer to the ideal point of the median voter than x R . In this case candidate R wins the election and implements x R . Otherwise, candidate L may credibly promise a policy −x R that, for the median voter is at least as good as x R , and voters believe him. Making a promise that allows him to win the election is a better strategy for L than allowing R to win, since he gets a higher utility even if he decides to fulfill his promise:
Thus, in equilibrium candidate L promises policy −x R , voters believe him and he wins the election 3 . At the office stage candidate L will not fulfill his promise if the gain he obtains from reneging is larger than the value of maintaining a good reputation.
The cost of reneging is the difference between his future expected payoff if he maintains a good reputation, and his future expected payoff if he loses his reputation, given that candidate R does not have a good reputation.
Let v GB (d) denote the one election expected utility for a candidate that has a good reputation when his opponent has a bad reputation. Similarly let v BB (d) denote the one election expected utility for each candidate when both have a bad reputation. Thus, given the assumptions of our model they yield to (see figure 2):
Given the one election expected payoffs, we can compute the expected future payoffs for a candidate with a good reputation, given that his opponent has a bad reputation:
Similarly the future expected payoffs for a candidate with a bad reputation given that his opponent also has a bad reputation are:
Thus we obtain the cost of reneging as a function of the maximal promise believed by voters and the discount factor. Let C S (d; δ) denote the cost of reneging. Then we have that
Therefore we can write it as:
The gain from reneging: the maximal gain a candidate may obtain from reneging of a promise is d, that is the maximal difference in utility between implementing the policy he promised and implementing his ideal point. Therefore, it is an optimal strategy for candidate L to fulfill all promises that are at most distance d from his ideal point, where d satisfies d ≤ C S (d; δ) It is also an optimal strategy for the voters to believe all promises that are at most a distance d such that d ≤ C S (d; δ) from the candidate's ideal point, since in equilibrium they will be fulfilled.
We denote by d S the value of d that solves
S is the maximal promise that a candidate will always fulfill, and it is also the maximal promise that voters will believe.
Since
2 > 0 and
we have that in equilibrium (see figure 3 we must have 0 < d S < 1, some promises may be believed iii) for 3 4 ≤ δ ≤ 1 we must have d S = 1, all promises may be believed.
Thus the promises that in equilibrium will be believed and fulfilled are:
Notice that the maximal promise believed in equilibrium is an increasing function of the discount factor. Thus, as the discount factor increases, the value of reputation (the cost of reneging) increases, and it implies that larger promises will be kept and believed in equilibrium. Now consider the case in which both candidates have a good reputation. Let v GG (d) denote the one election expected utility for a candidate that has a good reputation when both candidates have a good reputation. Similarly let v BG (d) denote the one election expected utility for a candidate who has a bad reputation when his opponent has a good reputation. As before we start by assuming that voters believe all promises that are at most a distance d away from the ideal point of the candidate. We then look for a function d D (δ) that characterizes the maximal promise that candidates will fulfill. When both candidates have a good reputation, that is, both candidates can make credible promises, the maximal promise that is incentive compatible could be different than the one we found in the case in which only one candidate can make credible promises. Thus, it is necessary to use d s to compute v BG (.). Given the assumptions of our model, they yield to (see figure 4):
In this case the future expected payoff for a candidate who has a good reputation when the other candidate also has a good reputation is
Similarly, the future expected payoff for a candidate who has a bad reputation when his opponent has a good reputation is
Thus the cost of reneging for a candidate is given by
and can be written as:
Notice that the expected value of maintaining a good reputation for a candidate is the same independently of whether his opponent has a good or a bad reputation, that is
Therefore we obtain that (see figure 5 ),
This implies that we must have d
. Thus, if both candidates have a good reputation, the maximal promises that are going to be fulfilled by candidates and believed by voters in equilibrium are the same as in the case in which only one candidate has a good reputation. d S (δ) characterizes an equilibrium in which the promises that voters believe are all promises that are incentive compatible. But there is a continuum of equilibria with similar characteristics: for all d ≤ d S , there is an equilibrium in which voters believe promises up to a distance d away from the candidate ideal point.
Notice that it is also an optimal strategy for the voters to punish a candidate that reneges of his promise, since the instantaneous utility for voters is reduced by d, and they obtain no extra gain in expected future payoffs.
We obtain that, in equilibrium, both candidates fulfill all the promises they make, and voters believe all promises candidates make: both candidates maintain a good reputation over time.
which implies that the value of maintaining a good reputation for a candidate who faces an opponent with a good reputation is equal to the value of maintaining a good reputation when he faces an opponent with a bad reputation, therefore, in this model reputation is not a strategic complement nor a strategic substitute. This result is due to the linearity assumed in the utility functions and would presumably change if candidates' utility functions were concave.
We can also analyze the effects of maintaining a good reputation on the welfare of the median voter. The median voter's expected utility from each election as a function of the credible promises in equilibrium is given by:
Thus, the median voter is better off when both candidates have a good reputation because all promises are made toward the median voter. In equilibrium both candidates have a good reputations and the utility of the median voter increases with the size of the set of credible promises.
Reputation does not have an effect on the candidates' payoffs in equilibrium. Equilibrium payoffs are the same when both candidates have a reputation as when neither does. Again, if we assume concave utilities this result would change. We should expect a Pareto gain (to be shared between candidates) from moving toward the center: the gain to the loser is greater than the loss to the winner. (This is very similar to the effect in ).
Random median voter
In the model analyzed in the previous sections of this paper we assume that the ideal points of the candidates change from election to election and that the ideal point of the median voter does not change over time. These assumptions can be interpreted as if voters had stable preferences but the issues changed from election to election. For instance, in one period the campaign main issue, and therefore the candidates' promises, are on tax reform, the next election the issue is abortion, etc. At each election the ideal point of the median voters is normalized to be zero, and the candidates' ideal points are different reflecting the different relative positions of all agents for each specific issue.
In this section we develop a variation of the previous model. Here we assume that candidates' ideal points are fixed at all elections, and that the ideal point of the median voter changes across elections. This variation of the model can be interpreted as if candidates have long run, stable ideal points over some broad income distribution. The assumption that the ideal point of the median voter is random represents the idea that the voters' preferences change over time due to demographic changes or changes in the economy.
Consider the following modification in the formal model described previously, where the ideal points of the candidates are x L = 0 and x R =1 at all elections, and the ideal point of the median voter m at each election is an independent realization of uniform random variable on the interval [0, 1] .
As before first consider the case in which one the candidates has a good reputation (L) and the other candidate has a bad reputation (R).
In this case we will have that the expected payoffs from one election for candidate L are:
We describe a number of features that can be introduced in our basic model of reputation. The introduction of each of them will affect the size of the set of promises that are credible in equilibrium. When we consider variations of the model that imply that reputation is more valuable (larger cost of reneging), we will obtain that more promises are credible in equilibrium. Similarly, when reputation turns out to be less valuable (smaller cost of reneging), in equilibrium less promises will be credible. Discount factor: As the value of the discount factor decreases, the value of future payoffs also decrease, and therefore reputation becomes less valuable, and less promises will be credible in equilibrium. Therefore we can conclude that reputation is more valuable for candidates that have a larger probability of running for reelection and voters should be more likely to believe their promises.
Utility function: As we mentioned before, in this model the payoffs for a candidate that faces an opponent with his same reputation are constant. The reason is that we assume linear utility functions. If instead we consider that candidates' utility functions are concave we should find that candidates would be better off when more promises are credible, since in this case promise would play the role of insurances.
Distribution of ideal points: We have assumed that the candidates' ideal points are drawn from uniform distribution. If instead we assume that ideal points are more likely to take values closer to the median voter, the value of maintaining a good reputation should be smaller, since losing an election is not as costly, therefore more promises will be believed.
Symmetric uncertainty: Suppose that between the voting stage and the office stage the policy preferences of the winner suffer a shock that changes the ideal point with some positive probability. In the case analyzed in the previous section, all promises made by a candidate during the campaign are always fulfilled in equilibrium. Adding uncertainty about the candidates' preferences alters this: we will then have that some promises that are believed in equilibrium will not be fulfilled. Furthermore, larger probability of shocks on candidates' preferences also imply a lower future expected value, and therefore in equilibrium we will obtain a smaller d : less promises are going to be believed.
Punishment: We have assumed that the punishment of voters to candidates that renege is extreme: after a candidate reneges once voters keep for all future election the punishment of not believing any of his promises.
There are other equilibria in which voters punishment is less extreme. We could think that after a candidate reneges once, voters apply the same punishment to the candidate for a finite number of periods, and believe his incentive compatible promises afterwards. Since the future expected payoffs will be lower in equilibrium we will obtain lower d, thus more promises will be credible.
We can also think of equilibria in which voters punish candidates that renege by "shrinking" the set of promises they believe.
Another possibility is to assume that voters punish a candidate only after a number of times he has reneged, then in equilibrium candidates will have to use mixed strategies before the candidate has reneged enough times to be punished, and back to the pure strategies described here afterwards. Voters will believe that the candidate may renege with positive probability anytime he makes a maximal promise. We should expect that in this case, voters will believe more promises after the candidate has reneged once.
